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Still Standing After All These Years:*
Five Decades of Litigation Under the
Fair Housing Act and the Supreme
Court Still Can’t Say for Sure Who Is
Protected
David A. Logan**
INTRODUCTION

The 1960s was one of the most turbulent decades in modern
American history, marred by assassinations, widespread civil
unrest, and a highly divisive war in Vietnam.1 But it was also a
decade of important legislative accomplishments,2 including a
stronger safety net for the poor,3 protection of the environment,4
*
With apologies to Paul Simon.
** Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. Thanks to
Mike Green, Justin Kishbaugh, Wayne Logan, John Noyes, and Jeanne Wine
for their helpful comments on an earlier draft and to Nicole Dyszlewski,
Lucinda Harrison-Cox, and Alisha Hennen for their excellent research
assistance.
1. See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
2331, 2349 (1993) (“A collage of developments—the Civil Rights movement,
the Vietnam War and the opposition to it, urban riots—contributed to a
profound unsettlement about the direction the country was taking.”). Accord
Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 34 (2007)
(“Urban riots, campus unrest, political violence, and a spate of prominent
assassinations and multiple murders gripped the nation . . . .”).
2. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY
CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS 1946–1990, at 56–61 (1991)
(listing major legislation passed 1960–70).
3. John Charles Boger, Race and the American City: The Kerner
Commission in Retrospect—An Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289, 1341
(1993) (“Of course, since the mid-1960s a number of important noncash
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and bans on discrimination in voting and employment.5 One of
the less-known of these legislative achievements was the passage
of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which made discrimination in
housing a violation of federal law.6
Five decades after its passage, the FHA plays a “continuing
role in moving the Nation toward a more integrated society.”7
Nevertheless, despite congressional amendment and many federal
court decisions, important questions about the law remain
unsettled, not least who can claim it protections. This uncertainty
was on display in the most recent term of the Supreme Court of
the United States in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami.8
The next section of this article provides background on the FHA
and subsequent sections consider the opinions in City of Miami
and provide a critique of the Court’s analysis. I conclude that
despite a plaintiff victory in City of Miami, the Court’s convoluted
torts analysis may have, in effect, overruled three venerable
precedents and dealt a fatal blow to an important tool for
combatting housing discrimination.
I.

THE FAIR HOUSING ACT

By early 1968, the Civil Rights Movement had secured
important legislative successes, winning federal statutory
protection for access to public accommodations, voting rights, and
equal employment,9 but a key goal—legislation targeting racial
programs have been created or expanded to help low-income recipients,
including the Food Stamp program, the Medicaid program[,] . . . nutritional
programs such as the School Lunch Program, and the supplemental food
program for women, infants, and children (WIC).” (citations omitted)).
4. The Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903
(1965) (formerly codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1151) (requiring states to adopt water
quality standards and made the federal government responsible for the
review and approval of these standards).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-1 to a-2; 2000e-3 (2012);
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2012).
6. The Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968),
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–
3619 (2016)).
7. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525–26 (2015). Inclusive Cmtys. is discussed in more
detail infra note 172 and accompanying text.
8. 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
9. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-1 to a-2; 2000e3 (2012); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2012).
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discrimination in housing—proved even more difficult to achieve.
Minorities seeking better living conditions were severely
disadvantaged by an array of misconduct, ranging from obvious
discrimination, such as refusing to sell or rent property to
qualified minority home seekers,10 to the more subtle “red lining”
(making it harder and more expensive for minority buyers to get
loans)11 and “steering” (channeling minorities to predominately
minority neighborhoods).12 This discrimination had a negative
impact on access to jobs, quality education, and even personal
safety.13 However, the proposed legislation inspired ferocious
pushback because people care deeply about whom they live near.14
Indeed, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was pelted with stones when
10. Refusal is the “most obvious form of housing discrimination . . . .
Typically, this refusal is not outright, but rather manifests itself in the form
of grudging sales techniques that defy common sense and business logic. . . .
The list of possible delaying tactics and burdensome procedures is endless.” 1
JOHN P. RELMAN, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION PRACTICE MANUAL § 2.2 (Thomson
West 2008).
11. The term “redlining” takes its name from manuals produced by the
federal Home Owners Loan Corporation that sorted neighborhoods based
upon perceived credit risk, a conclusion often based upon the presence of, or
predicted increase in, minority population; black neighborhoods were
considered the least credit-worthy and colored red. Benjamin Howell,
Exploiting Race and Space: Concentrated Subprime Lending as Housing
Discrimination, 94 CAL. L. REV. 101, 107–08 (2006); see also RICHARD
ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) (arguing that conscious
government policies played an important role in racial segregation in
housing).
12. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 366 n.1 (1982)
(“[R]eal estate brokers and agents preserve and encourage patterns of racial
segregation in available housing by steering members of racial and ethnic
groups to buildings occupied primarily by members of such racial and ethnic
groups and away from buildings and neighborhoods inhabited primarily by
members of other races or groups.”). The author represented the plaintiffs in
the Havens Realty case.
13. See GUNNAR MYRDAL ET AL., AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 618 (1944) (“[B]ecause Negro people do
not live near white people, they cannot . . . associate with each other in many
activities founded on common neighborhood. Residential segregation . . .
becomes reflected in uni-racial schools, hospitals and other institutions.”).
14. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 190–91, 264 (2004)
(explaining that while whites increasingly opposed racial discrimination in
voting, public transportation, and higher education, housing segregation was
widespread and supported by whites in both the North and the South).
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he marched for fair housing in Chicago, prompting him to remark
that “I think the people of Mississippi ought to come to Chicago to
learn how to hate.”15
The “long hot summer” of 1967, with full-out rioting in cities
across the country, propelled race relations to the top of the
national agenda,16 but legislators who covered their racism behind
the fig leaf of “states’ rights” remained a significant roadblock to
the passage of legislation banning housing discrimination.17 This
widespread civil unrest prompted President Lyndon Johnson to
establish the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
(the Kerner Commission), a distinguished group of citizens
appointed to investigate the root causes of the discord and propose
solutions.18 The Commission reported back on March 1, 1968, and
concluded that the riots were caused by racism in general and
housing discrimination in particular.19 The Commission
specifically recommended the passage of a “comprehensive and
enforceable federal open-housing law to cover the sale or rental of
all housing . . . .”20
Although Senate opponents of fair housing legislation had

15. Gene Roberts, Rock Hits Dr. King as Whites Attack March in
Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1966, at A1.
16. Bethany A. Corbin, Should I Stay or Should I Go?: The Future of
Disparate Impact Liability Under the Fair Housing Act and Implications for
the Financial Services Industry, 120 PENN. ST. L. REV. 421, 428–29, 428 n.35
(2015) (recounting that race riots erupted in 164 cities, causing thousands of
injuries and significant property damage, and were serious enough to require
deployment of the National Guard).
17. IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL
APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 16
(2014) (“That’s what ‘states’ rights’ defended, though in the language of statefederal relations rather than white supremacy. Yet this was enough of a fig
leaf to allow persons queasy about black equality to oppose integration
without having to admit, to others and perhaps even to themselves, their
racial attitudes.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based
Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 472 (2001)
(“‘[M]oderate’ defenders of apartheid sought to shift the debate from the
substantive morality of racism to the procedural morality of localism and
states’ rights.”).
18. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks Upon Signing Executive
Order Establishing the Commission (July 29, 1967), in 3 WEEKLY
COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Aug. 7, 1967, at 1068.
19. OTTO KERNER ET AL., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON CIVIL DISORDERS 5 (1968).
20. Id. at 13.
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successfully filibustered three times, and withstood some of the
legendary LBJ arm-twisting21 (he made Air Force jets available to
senators to get them from their home states to D.C. for a crucial
vote),22 the momentum created by the riots and the release of the
Kerner Commission report enabled supporters to corral enough
votes to send a fair housing bill to the floor of the Senate, and soon
thereafter the legislation was passed 71–20.23 Nevertheless, the
prospects for passage in a more conservative House of
Representatives appeared bleak.24
Fate intervened, however, in the form of the tragic
assassination of Dr. King on April 4, 1968, which triggered
another wave of rioting, and for first time, massive civil unrest
reached Washington, D.C.25 With portions of the city ablaze, and
National Guard deployed (troops were even stationed in the
Capitol building itself), the House rushed to consider the Senate
bill.26 The crisis provided President Johnson an opening: he urged
passage of federal fair housing legislation before the burial of Dr.
King as a fitting memorial to a man who was killed because he
believed in racial equality.27 The confluence of these dramatic
21. Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the
New Age, 47 DUKE L. J. 899, 923 n.85 (1998) (noting that Johnson was
“renowned” for his “arm-twisting” and “cajolery”); see also ROBERT A. CARO,
THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 588–90 (2002)
(describing how Johnson gave reluctant Senators “the Johnson treatment”);
ROWLAND EVANS & ROBERT NOVAK, LYNDON B. JOHNSON: THE EXERCISE OF
POWER 104 (1966) (“[It was] supplication, accusation, cajolery, exuberance,
scorn, tears, complaint, the hint of threat . . . . He moved in close, his face a
scant millimeter from his target, his eyes widening and narrowing, his
eyebrows rising and falling. From his pockets poured clippings, memos,
statistics. Mimicry, humor, and the genius of analogy made The Treatment
an almost hypnotic experience and rendered the target stunned and
helpless.”).
22. Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a
Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 155 (1969).
23. Id. at 158–59.
24. Corbin, supra note 16, at 430.
25. JOHN T. ELLIFF, CRIME, DISSENT, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: THE
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT IN THE 1960’S, at 112 (Joel B. Grossman ed., Sage Pub.,
Inc. 1971) (“Dr. King’s assassination triggered a wave of rioting in over a
hundred cities, including serious disorders and widespread property
destruction in Washington, D.C. . . . .”).
26. Dubofsky, supra note 22, at 160.
27. History of Fair Housing, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., http://
portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_
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events caused the opposition to crumble and debate on the floor
was limited to a single hour; the House acceded to the Senate bill
by a 250–171 margin and the President signed the Fair Housing
Act (FHA) into law the very next day.28
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, also known as the
Fair Housing Act of 1968 banned housing discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, and national origin, with the goal of
replacing residential ghettos with “truly integrated and balanced
living patterns.”29 The statute provides a damages remedy for any
“aggrieved person,” defined as “any person who . . . claims to have
been injured by a discriminatory housing practice.”30 The next
section discusses the opinions in the Supreme Court’s most recent
FHA decision, Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, and
considers who is protected by the statute.
II. THE DECISION

Determining exactly who has standing to sue to enforce the
FHA is complicated by the “protracted and chaotic” circumstances
surrounding its passage.31 With no committee reports and scant
floor debate there is little from the congressional record to help
answer important questions that arise under the Act, including
who has standing to sue.32
Three Supreme Court decisions, handed down between 1972
and 1982, however, read the FHA broadly, granting standing not
only to minority home seekers, but also to parties who were not
actually the targets of discrimination, but nevertheless injured as
a result.33 For example, in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
opp/aboutfheo/history (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
28. Dubofsky, supra note 22, at 160.
29. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting 114
CONG. REC. 2706 (statement of Sen. Mondale)). In 1988, Congress added
bans on discrimination on the basis of “sex,” “familial status,” and
“handicap.” See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1303
(2017) (discussing congressional actions in 1988).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602(i)(1), 3613(a)(1)(A), 3613(c)(1) (2012).
31. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION
§ 5.2 (Thomson Reuters 2017).
32. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210 (“The legislative history of the Act is not
too helpful.”); see also Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 (3d
Cir. 1977) (remarking that the legislative history of FHA is “somewhat
sketchy”).
33. See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212; see also Havens Realty Corp. v.
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Insurance, the Court allowed white tenants of an apartment
complex to sue for damage to their right to live in an integrated
community,34 while in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
a town was allowed to sue for the tax revenue it lost and the harm
to its racial balance caused by racial steering.35 Finally, Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman recognized standing for both a civil rights
group that spent its scarce resources to ferret out housing
discrimination and for white “testers” who were working
undercover to obtain evidence that a realtor was engaging in
racial steering.36 These three standing decisions supported a
conclusion that the sweep of the FHA is as broad as allowed by
Article III.37
Like many municipalities, the City of Miami experienced a
tidal wave of foreclosures when the housing market collapsed in
2007–2008. Because of the resulting harm to city coffers, and
relying upon the favorable FHA precedents, the city filed suit in
federal district court alleging that lending institutions subjected
African-American and Latino borrowers to “predatory loans that
carried more risk, steeper fees and higher costs than those offered
to identically situated white customers, and created internal
incentive structures that encouraged employees to provide these
types of loans.”38 The city claimed that it was an “aggrieved
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 111 (1979).
34. 409 U.S. at 211–12.
35. 441 U.S. at 110–11.
36. 455 U.S. at 379.
37. See David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of
Powers Analysis, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 37, 42 (1984) (arguing that the Supreme
Court’s FHA decisions support the view that Congress has the power to
“provide judicial redress to parties asserting even novel claims with
attenuated causal relationships”); see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure
of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223–24 (1988) (“If a duty is statutory,
Congress should have essentially unlimited power to define the class of
persons entitled to enforce that duty, for congressional power to create the
duty should include the power to define those who have standing to enforce
it.”).
38. City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir.
2015). The city introduced evidence that African-American borrowers were
1.6 times more likely to receive a discriminatory loan than a similarly
situated white borrower and that Latino borrowers were 2.1 times more
likely to experience discrimination. Id. at 1268. Unsurprisingly, such
unfavorable terms resulted in far more minority borrowers being subject to
foreclosure when the real estate market imploded. Id. at 1268–69.
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person” within the meaning of the statute because these
discriminatory practices caused huge numbers of foreclosures in
predominantly minority neighborhoods,39 resulting in blighted
areas, lower property tax collections, and higher costs for police,
fire, and other city services.40
The district court held that the city lacked standing to sue on
two grounds: first, the city’s injuries were not in the “zone of
interests” protected by the FHA and second, any bank misconduct
was not the “proximate cause” of the injuries alleged by the city.41
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, allowing
the lawsuit to proceed42 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to hear the banks’ appeal.43
The Court upheld the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to allow the
case to proceed by a 5–3 vote, with Justice Breyer writing for the
majority, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsberg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan.44 Justice Thomas, joined by Justices
Kennedy and Alito concurred in part and dissented in part.45
Justice Breyer began his majority opinion by recognizing that
in order to have standing to sue the plaintiff must show an “injury
in fact” that is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s misconduct.46
This means that when a plaintiff asserts a claim for damages
under a statute, the plaintiff’s interests must fall within the “zone
of interests” that Congress intended to protect when passing the
legislation.47 He then turned to the three earlier FHA decisions—
Trafficante, Gladstone, and Havens—which he characterized as
supporting the view that the FHA conferred standing “as broadly

39. Id. at 1274, 1277–78.
40. Id. at 1269.
41. City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 171 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1319–20
(S.D. Fla. 2016).
42. City of Miami, 800 F.3d at 1289.
43. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1302 (2017).
44. Id. at 1301. See generally Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on
the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html (detailing
the life and unexpected death of Justice Antonin Scalia, creating a sudden
vacancy on the Supreme Court, and thus, leaving an eight-member court).
45. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1301.
46. Id. at 1302 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547
(2016)).
47. Id. at 1302–03.
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as is permi[ssible] by . . . the Constitution.”48 He bolstered this
conclusion by pointing out that when Congress amended the FHA
in 1988, it “retained without significant change the definition of
‘person aggrieved’ that this Court had broadly construed” in the
trio of Supreme Court decisions.49
The banks argued that the language from these decisions
represented dicta and that Congress could not have intended to
expand statutory protections “to the limits of Article III,” which
they claimed would mean that literally anybody harmed by a
discriminatory act would have standing.50 Justice Breyer
disagreed, countering that the city’s financial injuries “fall within
the zone of interests that the FHA protects.”51 To support this
conclusion he pointed to Gladstone, where the Court held that a
town had standing under the FHA for the depressed housing
market and the resultant “significant reduction in property values
[that] directly injures the municipality by diminishing its tax
base, thus threatening its ability to bear the costs of local
government and to provide services.”52 This claim was sufficiently
analogous to the claim asserted by Miami that the principle of
stare decisis, plus Congress’ “decision to ratify those precedents”
while amending the statute in 1988, meant that the city had
sufficiently alleged injury in fact.53
The remaining standing question was whether the banks’
misconduct was the “proximate cause” of the city’s injuries. The
Eleventh Circuit had applied a “foreseeability” test and concluded
that the allegations were sufficient to avoid dismissal because the
banks had access to “analytical tools as well as published reports
drawing the link between predatory lending practices ‘and their

48. Id. at 1303 (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 209
(1972)). Justice Breyer noted that similarly expansive language appeared in
Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109 (1979) and Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372, 275–76 (1982).
49. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1303.
50. Id. at 1304. “The Banks say it would be similarly farfetched if
restaurants, plumbers, utility companies or any other participant in the local
economy could sue the banks for the business they lost when people had to
give up their homes and leave the neighborhood as a result of the banks’
discriminatory lending practices.” Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1305 (quoting Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 110–11).
53. Id.
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attendant harm,’ such as premature foreclosure and the resulting
costs to the City, including, most notably, a reduction in property
tax revenues.”54 As a result, even though there were “several
links in the causal chain” between the wrongdoing and the city’s
harms, the appeals court concluded that the injuries were
sufficiently foreseeable to withstand a motion to dismiss.55
Justice Breyer rejected this foreseeability-based analysis.56
He began the majority’s discussion of causation by pointing out
that FHA claims are a statutory-based version of a tort,57 and
proximate cause determinations in tort actions that are based
upon a statute, like the city’s claim, require analysis of the
“nature of the statutory cause of action.”58 A viable FHA claim
requires that the injuries alleged cannot be caused by “any remote
cause,” and the determination of how remote is too remote must
be based upon whether the harm alleged has “a sufficiently close
connection to the conduct the statute prohibits.”59 To Justice
Breyer, “foreseeability alone is not sufficient to establish
proximate cause under the FHA.”60
Justice Breyer pointed out that because a housing market is
“interconnected with economic and social life,” a violation of the
FHA could “cause ripples of harm to flow” far beyond
a
61
defendant’s misconduct.
In light of this broad and deep
interconnectedness, Justice Breyer was unwilling to conclude that
Congress intended the FHA to provide a remedy “wherever the
ripples travel” because such litigation could be “massive and
complex,” a possible outcome under the foreseeability test applied
by the Court of Appeals.62 To avoid this result, a plaintiff must
54. City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1282 (11th Cir.
2015). The Court of Appeals rejected the banks’ argument that the injury
had to be the “sole” proximate cause, “direct,” and “not derivative.” Id. at
1278–82.
55. Id. at 1282.
56. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1306.
57. Id. at 1305 (“A claim for damages under the FHA . . . is akin to a ‘tort
action.’” (citation omitted)).
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 1377, 1390 (2014)).
60. Id. at 1306.
61. Id. (quoting Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 534 (1983)).
62. Id.
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prove a “direct relation between the injury asserted and the
injurious conduct alleged,”63 and the “general tendency . . . is to
not go beyond the first step.”64 This, in turn requires an
assessment of what is “administratively possible and
convenient.”65
At this point in the majority opinion, it seemed as if Justice
Breyer was endorsing the defendant’s argument that the city’s
claim should be dismissed because “the distance between the
violation and the harms the City claims to have suffered is simply
too great.”66 This, however, was not the case, as Justice Breyer
instead vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remanded, leaving it to the lower courts to determine whether the
city’s injuries satisfied the directness test.67
Justice Thomas, writing for Justices Kennedy and Alito,
concurred in part and dissented in part.68 As to the “zone of
interests” question, Justice Thomas argued that the FHA had a
narrower ambit than that recognized by the majority, and
analogized the Act to prior standing decisions that had
significantly limited the class of proper plaintiffs alleging
employment discrimination under Title VII.69 Characterizing the
sweeping language in Trafficante, Gladstone, and Havens as “‘illconsidered’ dictum leading to ‘absurd consequences,’”70 Justice
Thomas argued that the interests of Miami were “markedly
distinct” from the interests that the Court confronted in the
earlier FHA cases.71 As a result, the city’s injuries were “so
marginally related to” the purposes of the FHA that they fell
outside the zone of interests.72
On the second standing question, whether there was an

63. Id. (citing Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).
64. Id. (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 10
(2010)).
65. Id. (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268).
66. Id. at 1301.
67. Id. at 1306.
68. Id. at 1306 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69. Id. at 1307–08 (first citing Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP., 562
U.S. 170, 173, 175–78 (2011); then citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388–89 (2014)).
70. Id. at 1308 (quoting Thompson, 562 U.S. at 176).
71. Id. at 1309.
72. Id. at 1308.
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adequate causal link between the misconduct and the injury,
Justice Thomas concurred with the majority, agreeing that proof
that an injury was “foreseeable” was insufficient to satisfy the
proximate cause requirement for FHA claims.73 In his view, the
relationship between the banks’ discrimination and the injury to
the city was “exceedingly attenuated,”74 and, as a result, there
was “little doubt that neither Miami nor any similarly situated
plaintiff c[ould] satisfy the rigorous standard that the Court
adopt[ed].”75 Absent an adequate causation allegation, Justice
Thomas would have dismissed the case, rather than remanding,
because “the Court of Appeals has no advantage over us in
evaluating the complaint’s proximate-cause theory.”76
III. ANALYSIS

City of Miami was lauded by civil rights advocates as an
important victory and, at first glance, that enthusiasm is justified:
the Court continues to recognize that a broad range of injuries and
parties are within the “zone of interests” protected by the FHA,
and the Court gave the city a chance to prove sufficient causation
on remand.77 If Miami and other municipalities are eventually
successful at trial, banks would be on the hook for some of the
broad-ranging consequences of the rapacious lending that played
an important role in the Great Recession that began in 2008.78
This is especially important given the failure of the federal
government to pursue criminal sanctions against the corporate
73. Id. at 1311.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, An Important Victory for Civil Rights,
AM. CONST. SOC’Y (May 2, 2017), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/animportant-victory-for-civil-rights (examining how the City of Miami ruling is
a win for the Fair Housing Act); Phillip S. Stein & James J. Ward, Supreme
Court Ruling Permits City Lawsuits against Banks to Proceed, BILZEN
SUMBURG’S MORTGAGE CRISIS AND FIN. SERV. WATCH (May 1, 2017),
http://www.financialserviceswatchblog.com/2017/05/supreme-court-rulingpermits-city-lawsuits-against-banks-under-fha-to-proceed/#more-4484 (“This
is an extremely important decision.”).
78. See Kat Aaron, Predatory lending: A decade of warnings, CTR. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/
2009/05/06/5452/predatory-lending-decade-warnings
(explaining
that
subprime lenders earned enormous profits making mortgages to people who
clearly could not afford them).
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chieftains who oversaw the reckless lending.79
Permitting local governments to sue for discriminatory
lending is important for practical reasons: few minority home
seekers harmed by the banks’ misconduct could be expected to
navigate the chaos of a foreclosure, recognize that the loans they
took out were based upon discriminatory lending, and manage to
file suit within the FHA’s short two-year statute of limitations.80
Even if they could, it is undoubtedly difficult to find attorneys
willing to take on the financial burden of retaining the expert
witnesses needed to develop the technical and fact-intensive proof
showing that banking behemoths engaged in a pattern of
discrimination that harmed the tax base and increased the cost of
government services.81 On the other hand, municipal government
plaintiffs are in a much better position to deter bank misconduct
through civil litigation. First, governments are less susceptible to
statute of limitations defenses because the lost tax revenues and
higher costs continue for many years after the discriminatory
lending.82 Second, municipalities may take a page from the
playbook of the states that won billions of dollars from the tobacco
industry by partnering with powerhouse personal injury lawyers
79. Patrick Radden Keefe, Why Corrupt Bankers Avoid Jail, NEW
YORKER
(July
31,
2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2017/07/31/why-corrupt-bankers-avoid-jail (discussing why banks and
financial institutions were “too big to jail” despite the widespread wrongdoing
that led to the Great Recession); see generally JESSE EISINGER, THE
CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO PROSECUTE
EXECUTIVES (Simon & Schuster, 2017).
80. See Alex Gano, Note, Disparate Impact and Mortgage Lending: A
Beginner’s Guide, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1156, 1158 (2017).
81. See Andrew Lichtenstein, Note, United We Stand, Disparate We Fall:
Putting Individual Victims of Reverse Redlining in Touch with Their Class,
43 LOY. L. REV. 1339, 1367 (2010) (discussing the challenges faced by
individuals who may have a bona fide predatory lending claim, including the
difficulty of identifying misconduct in a timely manner because of its
subtlety, the “isolation of subprime communities,” informational asymmetries
and financial illiteracy of borrowers, a pleading standard that requires
information unavailable to plaintiffs and their lawyers without filing a claim,
and the need to retain and pay for expert witnesses).
82. See Gano, supra note 80, at 1153 (suggesting that cities can avoid
statute of limitations defenses by taking advantage of the continuing
violation doctrine). The impact of the foreclosure crisis upon municipalities
kept renewing itself with each new property tax shortfall and increase in
costs of services, so government plaintiffs had a longer time to file claims
than individual homeowners. See id.
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who have the staff and war chests to stand up to the titans of
finance.83
Nevertheless, a closer look at the causation aspect of City of
Miami suggests that such rosy conclusions may be unjustified,
and in fact raises the distinct possibility that the era of generous
grants of standing under the FHA is coming to a close.84
A.

Causation Conundrum

While the Court split 5–3 in favor of the city on the first
standing issue—whether the sweeping view of FHA standing
recognized in Trafficante, Gladstone, and Havens remains good
law—on the second issue, all of the justices endorsed a “direct
causation” test, rejecting the more generous foreseeability
analysis used by the Court of Appeals.85 In fact, Justice Thomas,
in concurrence on the causation issue, not only agreed that
directness was the proper test, but would have applied it to the
facts and dismissed the case entirely, rather than remanding as

83. See Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal,
Economic, and Political Legacy of the Governments’ Tobacco Litigation, 33
CONN. L. REV. 1143, 1147–49 (2001) (detailing how the alliance between
states and the “elite” of the plaintiffs’ bar provided the necessary resources to
take on “Big Tobacco”); Gregory W. Traylor, Note, Big Tobacco, MedicaidCovered Smokers, and the Substance of the Master Settlement Agreement, 63
VAND. L. REV. 1081, 1093–98 (2010); see also Jef Feeley & John Lauerman,
Opioid Costs Push Struggling States to Dust Off Tobacco Strategy,
BLOOMBERG (June 14, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-06-14/opioid-costs-push-struggling-states-to-dust-off-tobaccostrategy (quoting the author of this article that governments are hiring
private firms to seek damages from opioid manufacturers).
84. Of course, as a decision construing a federal statute, City of Miami
can be overturned by Congress and the President, a distinct possibility when
both branches are controlled by Republicans. See Roger Clegg, Silver Linings
Playbook: “Disparate Impact” and the Fair Housing Act, 2014 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 165, 186 (2014–2015) (urging Congress to amend the FHA to overrule
Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507 (2015), which had approved “disparate impact” claims by plaintiffs);
see also Protect Local Independence in Housing Act of 2015: Hearing on H.R.
3145 Before the H. of Rep., 114th Cong. (2015). The Court’s decision in
Inclusive Cmtys. is discussed infra at notes 172–75, and accompanying text.
85. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1312 (2017)
(Thomas, J., dissenting and concurring). Justice Thomas’ opinion agreed
with the majority that proof of “foreseeability” was not sufficient. Id. at 1311
(“Although I disagree with its zone-of-interests holding, I agree with the
Court’s conclusions about proximate cause.”).
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the majority directed.86
It is not surprising that all of the justices read the FHA to
require a meaningful causal link between the statutory violation
and injury to the plaintiff; this is a bedrock principle of tort law,
and FHA claims draw from the common law of torts.87 Indeed,
“[n]o serious question exists that some limit on the scope of
liability for tortious conduct that causes harm is required.”88 In
the context of common law tort actions, judges primarily, but not
exclusively, look to “proximate cause” for such a limitation.89 But
whatever the terminology,90 the resulting doctrinal mess has been
lamented by the great treatise writers,91 the American Law
Institute,92 and the Court itself,93 and City of Miami did nothing
86. Id. There is no way that the city could satisfy the “rigorous standard
for proximate cause that the Court adopts and leaves to the Court of Appeals
to apply” because the link between the alleged FHA violation and its asserted
injuries was “exceedingly attenuated.” Id.
87. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1305.
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010); accord W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 264 (West Pub. Co., 5th ed. 1984) (“Some
boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the
basis of some social idea of justice or policy.”).
89. Some courts limit liability by modifying the duty that the defendant
owed the plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. &
EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. c. The warring opinions in the classic case of Palsgraf
v. Long Island Railroad Co. reflect this divide, as Chief Judge Cardozo opted
for a duty analysis, while Judge Andrews dissented on the basis of proximate
cause. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. f. Cabining liability via limited duty rules is
discussed in more detail infra at notes 113–29.
90. Jessie Allen, The Persistence of Proximate Cause: How Legal Doctrine
Thrives on Skepticism, 90 DEN. L. REV. 77, 82 (2012) (“All three Restatements
of Torts have presented traditional proximate cause doctrines as deeply
vexed.”).
91. KEETON ET AL., supra note 88, at 263 (“There is perhaps nothing in
the entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement, or upon
which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion. Nor, despite the
manifold attempts which have been made to clarify the subject, is there yet
any general agreement as to the best approach.” (citation omitted)).
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29
cmt. b (“‘[P]roximate cause’ is a poor [term] to describe limits on the scope of
liability.”).
93. CSX Trans., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2645 (2011) (Roberts,
J., dissenting) (“The plurality breaks no new ground in criticizing the variety
of formulations of the concept of proximate cause; courts, commentators, and
first-year law students have been doing that for generations. But it is often
easier to disparage the product of centuries of common law than to devise a
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to fix the doctrinal confusion.
The Court had a range of options at its disposal, drawn from
precedents both venerable—like Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad
Co.94—and modern, like the American Law Institute’s
Restatement (Third) of Torts,95 but two approaches are the most
common.96 One approach, the “directness” test, focuses on the
chain of causation that links the defendant’s wrongdoing to the
plaintiff’s injury and denies compensation for those injuries that
are separated by one or more “links in a chain of causation”
because they are deemed “too remote” for recovery.97 The second
approach considers whether the plaintiff’s injuries were a
foreseeable consequence of defendant’s wrongdoing, focusing on
whether the injuries were within the “scope of the risk” the
defendant created, and allows liability for only those results
deemed to be “foreseeable.”98
A classic example of the directness approach is In re Polemis
and Furness, Withy & Co.99 In Polemis, a cargo sling dislodged a
wooden plank that a stevedore had negligently placed across the
hatchway over a ship’s hold.100 The falling plank hit the bottom of
the ship and caused sparks, which ignited flammables that
happened to be in the hold, leading to a fire that destroyed the
ship.101 While a falling plank created a foreseeable risk of hitting

plausible substitute.” (citations omitted)). This is not just a modern concern.
See, e.g., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474 (1876)
(referring to “the oft-embarrassing question, what is and what is not the
proximate cause of an injury”).
94. See 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM
§ 29.
96. See David A. Logan, Masked Media: Judges, Juries, and the Law of
Surreptitious Newsgathering, 83 IOWA L. REV. 161, 209–220 (1997)
(discussing proximate cause in greater detail).
97. Sometimes “direct” is paired with, or replaced by, a requirement that
the injury be a “natural” or “continuous” result of the wrongdoing. See
Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and
the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L. Q. 49, 81 (1991); see also Allen, supra
note 90, at 84.
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29
cmt. e, at 499–500 (“Courts have increasingly moved toward adopting a
foreseeability test for scope of liability in negligence cases.”).
99. See In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., (1921) 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.).
100. Id. at 560.
101. Id.
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any sailor standing below, it was highly unlikely to cause a fire.102
The court held that the fact that a fire was unforeseeable did not
preclude recovery because the fire was caused directly by the
falling plank—that is, without any significant intervening cause
or links in the chain of causation.103
Some courts in the United States adopted this “directness”
test for limiting liability,104 which is attractive because of its
apparent simplicity: look to the unassailable facts of nature to
identify the “links in the chain,” and recovery is denied if there are
“too many.”105 History, however, has not been kind to the
directness test, in Great Britain or in the United States.
The Polemis decision was considered and rejected in Overseas
Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. (The Wagon
Mound I).106 In The Wagon Mound I, the crew of an oil tanker
negligently allowed furnace oil to leak into a harbor, where it
flowed to and under the plaintiff’s dock 600 feet away.107
Workmen were using torches to repair the dock, and their falling
molten metal ignited cotton waste floating on the oil.108 The
waste acted as a wick, which ignited the oil and burned the
dock.109 The Wagon Mound I court repudiated the “direct
causation” rule of Polemis, and adopted a limitation on liability
based on the foreseeability of the risk.110 According to the court,
it is unfair to saddle a defendant—even a culpable one—with
liability for an unforeseeable kind of harm, even though a harmful
consequence of an entirely different kind was readily

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM
§ 29 reps.’ note at 511 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (collecting cases).
105. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1062 (N.Y.
2001) (explaining that victims of handgun violence cannot sue gun
manufacturers because the “connection between defendants, the criminal
wrongdoers and plaintiffs is remote, running through several links in a chain
consisting of at least the manufacturer, the federally licensed distributor or
wholesaler, and the first retailer.”).
106. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The
Wagon Mound I) [1961] AC 388 (HL) 389 (appeal taken from N.S.W.).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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foreseeable.111 The court elaborated that limiting liability to
foreseeable consequences:
accords with . . . the general public sentiment of moral
wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. It is a
departure from this sovereign principle if liability is made
to depend solely on the damage being the “direct” or
“natural” consequence of the precedent act. Who knows or
can be assumed to know all the processes of nature?112
Limiting liability based upon notions of directness—the test
adopted by all of the justices in City of Miami—has been harshly
criticized by scholars,113 rejected by the American Law Institute
in all three of the Torts Restatements,114 and increasingly
disdained by courts.115 The primary flaw was identified by the
court in Wagon Mound I: whether a result was caused directly
lacks a logical link to the justification for holding a defendant
liable in the first instance, and instead invites metaphysical
musings about the workings of nature.116 The directness test is
also easily manipulated by a judge who wishes to constrict (or
expand) the scope of liability, because deciding how many links is
“too many” is a subjective enterprise.117 The directness test is
111. Id.
112. Id. at 426.
113. Adding the locutions “natural” and “probable” does not fix the
problem. See Laurence H. Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding
Cause, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 123 (1937) (“Nor is clarity attained by the
repetitious utterance of a ritualistic formula about ‘natural and probable
consequences.’”); ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 26–
28 (1963) (criticizing the “natural and probable” test).
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29
reps.’ note (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
115. Id. (collecting cases).
116. See Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The
Wagon Mound I) [1961] AC 388 (HL) 425 (appeal taken from N.S.W.). Thus,
the direct test denies liability for injuries that are caused by a culpable
defendant regardless of whether the particular outcome was within the scope
of the risk associated with defendant’s wrongdoing, as long as it was caused
“directly.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 reps.’ note, cmt. e (“One major
problem with the ‘natural and continuous’ language is that it fails to confront
the essential concern of the proximate-cause limitation: actors should not be
held liable when the risk-producing aspects of their conduct cause harm other
than that which was risked by the tortious conduct.”).
117. See Frank J. Vandall, Duty: The Continuing Vitality of Dean Green’s
Theory, 15 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 343, 344 (1995); see also JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG
& BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS
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also confusing to the extent that it suggests that proximate cause
is only present when the wrongdoing is “close in space or time to
the plaintiff’s harm.”118 As William Prosser observed decades ago,
direct causation is an “[a]rtificial” test, purporting to fix liability
by reference to “a defendant [who] acts upon a set stage” because
it offers “a mechanical solution of a problem which is primarily
and essentially one of policy.”119 Finally, the directness test is
fatally flawed because it fails to provide a candid discussion of the
competing values at stake.120 As a leading treatise puts it, scope
of liability issues “call for judgments, not juggernauts of logic.”121
With such an impressive array of authorities rejecting a
directness test, one can wonder why a unanimous Court rescued a
discredited approach from the slag heap of history. The most
likely explanation is that the Court felt that the foreseeability test
adopted by the Court of Appeals provided insufficient protection to
lenders facing potentially sweeping FHA liability: the city could
convincingly argue that sophisticated financial players knew, or
should have known, that widespread predatory lending would not
only harm borrowers but also the communities that the borrowers
lived in. Stated differently, if a bank made thousands of
discriminatory loans despite knowing that many of the borrowers
were at high risk of foreclosure, then decreased property tax
revenues and increased need for city services were clearly
foreseeable and within the scope of the risk created by these
104, 106 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010) (explaining that the directness test is of
limited use as an analytical tool because whether an injury had been “directly”
caused by the defendant’s misconduct is not something that can be
determined with precision).
118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29
cmt. b.
119. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 304 (3d ed.
1964).
120. LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 196 (1927) (arguing
that limitation of liability should not be achieved by resort to “metaphysical”
concepts like “directness” or “foreseeability,” but rather by a forthright
balancing of various public policy considerations). The shape-shifting nature
of proximate cause was recognized by Judge Andrews in his dissent in
Palsgraf, 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). For Judge
Andrews, proximate cause involved “question[s] of fair judgment” that lead,
at best, not to a clear rule but only to “an uncertain and wavering line” that
would yield “practical” results “in keeping with the general understanding of
mankind.” Id.
121. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 181, 447 (2000).
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practices. Because the city itself was not subject to
discrimination,122 requiring proof of a “direct link” between the
wrong and the harm (instead of or in addition to foreseeability),123
provides defendants considerably more robust protection from
liability.124
Unfortunately, the opinions of Justices Breyer and Thomas
did not make explicit why such protection was important, but the
briefs of the parties and amici certainly did, underscoring that
Miami’s claim for damages was only one of many pending claims
brought by cities against lending institutions that engaged in
similar predatory behavior.125 These briefs also warned that a
victory for the city would expose lending institutions across the
country to massive liability.126 Such “floodgates” or “unlimited
liability” concerns have often been the basis for restrictive tort
rulings,127 whether by a strict application of proximate cause or by
122. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1300–01
(2017).
123. In a few situations, courts provide defendants double protection,
requiring proof of both directness and foreseeability. See DAN B. DOBBS ET
AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 704 (2d ed. 2015) (“[I]n certain commercial harm
cases . . . the harm must be both foreseeable and direct, dismissing the claim
for foreseeable harm if the harm was not also ‘direct.’”).
124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29
cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
125. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, n.1, City of Miami, 137 S. Ct.
1296 (No. 15-1111) (“At least twelve cities and local governments have
brought suit . . . .”); id. at 34 (“The new litigation follows the same model:
brought by outside counsel seeking contingency fees; relying on statistical
inferences of disparate impact; and demanding ‘hundreds of millions of
dollars’ in ‘compensatory damages alone,’ plus unspecified punitive damages.
And this . . . is just one of the many cases now being pursued by municipal
plaintiffs.”). Accord Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America As Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, 13, 16, City of
Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (No. 15-1111, 15-1112) (arguing that the Court of
Appeals decision “exposed lending institutions to virtually boundless liability,
with no limiting principle apparent to provide even a modicum of
predictability or proportionality;” affirming the Court of Appeals would
“accelerate the deluge of litigation” and be an insufficient response to the
“rising tide of municipal suits”).
126. Brief for the Petitioners at 12, City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (No. 151111, 15-1112) (“the potential liability that lenders face under the Eleventh
Circuit’s ruling is breathtaking”).
127. See Catherine M. Sharkey, The Remains of the Citadel (Economic
Loss Rule in Products Cases), 100 MINN. L. REV. 1845, 1870–71 (2016) (“The
floodgates concern is by no means unique to the realm of economic losses due
to defective products. Indeed, it is a common fear whenever a tort right is
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limiting the duty owed.128 These concerns were not prominent in
either of the Court’s opinions, with Justice Breyer only blandly
observing that the directness test took into consideration “what is
administratively possible and convenient”;129 even more
surprisingly, Justice Thomas failed to even raise the sweeping
economic impact that could result if Miami prevailed.
The Court could have been more transparent, and convincing,
if it had eschewed going down the rabbit hole of the directness test
for proximate cause and instead recognized that claims for lost
revenue by municipalities are fundamentally different from claims
brought by the primary beneficiaries of the FHA. People who are
actually subject to racial discrimination seek to vindicate
dignitary interests, or “harm to the personality,” like the interests
in a garden variety civil rights claim.130 Such intangible, noneconomic interests were at the heart of all of the Court’s previous
expanded. The thrust of the floodgates concern is typically dealt with via
proximate cause limitations.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Robert J. Rhee, A
Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims, 36
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 868–69 (2004) (“When courts refer to ‘infinite’ or ‘unlimited’
liability, the references are really shorthand for liability that is grossly
disproportionate to the underlying culpability.” (footnotes omitted));
Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (N.Y. 2001) (finding
that even though gun manufacturers could foresee that innocent victims
would be harmed by their products, the potential size of the universe of
claims was a basis for denying liability; “[t]his judicial resistance to the
expansion of duty grows out of practical concerns . . . about potentially
limitless liability.”).
128. See Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo (Kinsman II), 388 F.2d
821, 825 (2d Cir. 1968) (“In the final analysis, the circumlocution whether
posed in terms of ‘foreseeability,’ ‘duty,’ ‘proximate cause,’ [sic] ‘remoteness,’
etc. seems unavoidable.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Some courts use duty
in situations in which other courts would use proximate cause.”).
129. Bank of Am. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017).
130. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 623
(2d ed. 1993) (explaining that in claims for “dignitary injuries or injuries to
the personality” the “primary or usual concern is not economic at all, but
vindication of an intangible right . . . the affront to the plaintiff’s dignity as a
human being, the damage to his self-image, and the resulting mental
distress”); see also Colleen P. Murphy, Reviewing Congressionally Created
Remedies for Excessiveness, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 651, 668 (2012) (“In suits
involving invasions to dignitary interests (such as reputation and privacy), or
to civil rights (such as voting rights), courts have allowed damages that
redress the loss of the right itself . . . [and that] vindicate noneconomic,
rather than economic, rights.” (footnotes omitted)).
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FHA standing decisions. In Trafficante, the injury was to the
neighbors’ “interracial associations”;131 in Havens, the plaintiffs
sought damages for the racial discrimination actually experienced
by the testers and the harm to individual members of the civil
rights group who could not “live in an integrated community”;132
and the plaintiffs in Gladstone claimed harm to the village’s
interest in “racial balance and stability” and to the right of the
village’s residents to “select housing without regard to race,” along
with the “social and professional benefits of living in an integrated
society.”133 While the complaint in Havens also sought damages
for the cost of investigating discrimination134 and the plaintiffs in
Gladstone included an allegation of a “significant reduction in
property values [that] directly injures a municipality by
diminishing its tax base,”135 the gravamen of all of the relevant
precedents was injury to non-economic harms.
As a result, judicial clarity would have been better served by
an opinion that recognized that the core purpose of the FHA was
to protect those who experience dignitary harm as the result of
discrimination. Such a forthright approach to what the
Restatement (Third) of Torts calls the “scope of liability” problem
was perhaps best explained by Judge Andrews in his famous
dissent in Palsgraf: “What we do mean by the word ‘proximate’ is
that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of
justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events
beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is
practical
136
politics.”
131. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 209–10 (1972).
132. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 369 (1982).
133. Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 92 (1979).
134. Havens, 455 U.S. at 368.
135. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 95.
136. 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). Leading
scholars have endorsed such an approach. See, e.g., DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS, supra note 121, at § 181, 446, 447 (“Judgments about proximate cause
are not precise, but, at least roughly speaking, they reflect the ideas of justice
as well as practicality . . . . The proximate cause rules give us the language of
argument and direct the thought that is brought to bear when the connection
between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury seems tenuous.
The rules call for judgments, not juggernauts of logic.”); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 88, at § 44, 301 (“[T]he problem is not primarily one of causation at all,
since it does not arise until cause in fact is established. It is rather one of the
policy as to imposing legal responsibility.”).
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If the justices adopted such a candid approach in City of
Miami, the opinions would have expressly recognized that the lost
tax revenues and increased municipal expenses are analogous to
the many cases in which courts have aggressively limited damage
recoveries when the defendant’s misconduct causes economic
harm, but no injury to the plaintiff’s person or property.137 This
“economic loss rule” is long-standing and primarily based upon the
fear of massive liability and the risk that damages awards could
bankrupt defendants that provide valuable services to our
society.138 Courts cite the possible “domino effect,”139 because of
the risk that civil actions for economic harm may create liability
“in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class.”140 So, for example, when a utility’s gross
misconduct caused a massive blackout that harmed millions of
people and businesses in New York City, the court sharply
restricted the availability of damages.141 Similarly, courts have
placed strict limitations upon the liability of some service
providers, like lawyers and stock advisors, because of the way in

137. See Robert L. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries and the Economic Loss
Rule in Tort, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 857, 864 (2006); Vincent R. Johnson, The
Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
523, 529 (2009); Eileen Silverstein, On Recovery in Tort for Pure Economic
Loss, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 403, 405–07 (1999).
138. See DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 121, at § 452, 1283 (courts
sharply limit the scope of recovery for pure economic harm because “financial
harm tends to generate other financial harm endlessly and often in many
directions.”). These liability-limiting doctrines generally apply when the
defendant is guilty of “mere negligence.” See Rhee, supra note 127, at 868–69
(“When courts refer to ‘infinite’ or ‘unlimited liability,’ the references are
really shorthand for liability that is grossly disproportionate to the
underlying culpability.”). However, Strauss involved gross negligence and so
recognizes that limitations may be appropriate even when the defendant, like
the lenders in City of Miami, were guilty of highly culpable conduct. See infra
note 141 and accompanying text.
139. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS § 41.7, 1071–72 (2000);
David R. Owen, Recovery for Economic Loss under U.S. Maritime Law: Sixty
Years under Robins Dry Dock, 18 J. MAR. L. & COM. 157, 163 (1987).
140. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
141. Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 38 (N.Y. 1985) (limiting
liability to those who suffered some physical harm or who were in a
contractual relationship with the utility); see also Robins Dry Dock & Repair
Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 304 (1927) (placing limits on liability where
misfeasance causes purely economic harm).
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which economic losses can “ripple” through the economy.142
Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States has rejected tort
recoveries for harms that are purely economic despite provable
misconduct.143
Briefs filed in support of the defendants in City of Miami
drove home that a decision for the city meant that lenders across
the country would face sweeping and perhaps economically
ruinous liability.144 They also identified other possible
repercussions even if lenders could avoid bankruptcy from FHA
claims brought by hundreds of municipalities: if loans to minority
home seekers can be the basis of liability to governments, then
lenders would be exposed to “legal risks disproportionate to any
commercial gain they might recoup” from making loans, and thus,
may react by “offering fewer loan products suitable for low-income
individuals, thus reducing the credit options available to lessqualified borrowers.”145
It would seem that this line of argument would have been the
better course in City of Miami, rather than remanding and
hurling the lower courts into the thicket of proximate causation.
Such a forthright approach has the added benefit of providing a
roadmap for Congress if there is a move to amend the FHA to
142. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982) (“In the
absence of direct guidance from Congress, and faced with the claim that a
particular injury is too remote from the alleged violation to warrant § 4
standing, the courts are thus forced to resort to an analysis no less elusive
than that employed traditionally by courts at common law with respect to the
matter of ‘proximate cause.’”); see also David B. Lytle & Beverly Purdue,
Antitrust Target Area under Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Determination of
Standing in Light of the Alleged Antitrust Violation, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 795,
796–802 (1976) (noting that, because antitrust violations, like tortious acts,
may result in “virtually endless repercussions,” a sense of fairness and
proportionality led courts to impose this limitation on § 4 recovery); Pegeen
Mulhern, Comment, Marine Pollution, Fishers, and the Pillars of the Land: A
Tort Recovery Standard for Pure Economic Losses, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 85, 122 (1990) (“A predictable system of compensation is critical to the
financial stability of many coastal communities . . . [to avoid] the ripple effect
through [their] econom[ies] . . . .”).
143. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 876
(1986) (rejecting a tort claim for economic damages arising out of poor
performance of a product).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 125, 126.
145. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8–9, Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of
Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).

2018]

FAIR HOUSING

193

overrule one or more of the sweeping interpretations given to the
statute by the Court decades ago.146
B. The Roles of Judge and Jury
Another interesting aspect of the majority opinion in City of
Miami was the decision to remand for fact-finding, despite the
justices’ obvious skepticism that the city will be able to prove that
its fiscal harm was the “direct result” of misconduct by the
lenders.147 The hornbook rule instructs that whether a particular
wrong is considered a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury is
an issue of fact to be decided by the jury, unless the trial judge
determines that no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff.148
However, courts have adopted a different approach to the
apportionment of responsibility between judge and jury when the
plaintiff’s claim diverges from the model of the classic personal
injury action, as when a plaintiff alleges no injury to her person or
property but nevertheless can show economic or emotional
harm.149
So for example, the rule limiting recovery for claims of “pure
economic harm,” raises an issue of law for the court, but operates
in much the same liability-limiting way as proximate cause, which
is generally an issue of fact for the jury.150 Similarly, when a
bystander witnesses a terrible accident and suffers severe
emotional distress, many courts have adopted specific rules that
146. See Jamal Greene, Maximinimalism, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 637
(2016); Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by
the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. L. REV. 181, 222 (2009).
147. See City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1301, 1306; id. at 1311 (Thomas, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
148. See DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS, supra note 139, at 292
(“Although judges are not empowered to decide the factual disputes in a case,
they are definitely empowered to conclude that there is no evidence at all and
equally empowered to conclude that the evidence is so weak that reasonable
people could not accept it as sufficient to prove the plaintiff’s case.”); W.
Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 729
(2008) (“Nevertheless, courts appropriately rule as a matter of law on factual
matters, including whether the defendant acted negligently or whether there
is proximate cause when no reasonable jury could find otherwise.”).
149. See Level 3 Commc’ns v. Liberty Corp., 535 F.3d 1146, 1162 (10th
Cir. 2008) (applying Colorado law).
150. Id. at 1162–63; Eddward P. Ballinger, Jr. & Samuel A. Thumma,
The Continuing Evolution of Arizona’s Economic Loss Rule, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.
REV. 535, 563 (2007).
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require the trial judge to dismiss the claim regardless of whether
a reasonable jury could find that the bystander’s injury was
“foreseeable” or “proximate.”151 As the most recent Restatement
(Third) of Torts observed, “[g]enerally, no- or limited-duty rules
have been employed to limit liability for other harms, such as
economic loss, for which tort law has historically provided less
protection.”152 If Justice Breyer had recognized that the city’s
claim was, in essence, one for “pure economic harm,” there would
have been no need to tax the parties, the district and circuit
courts, and a jury with a remand that requires the parties to
develop complex proof and the jury to evaluate sophisticated data,
especially given the strong suggestion in the majority opinion that
the ultimate result on remand will be dismissal.153 Alternatively,
Justice Breyer could have joined Justice Thomas, who considered
the same evidence and concluded that no reasonable jury could
find a sufficiently close link between any bank misconduct and
Miami’s injury.154
Palsgraf is again instructive regarding the question of the
respective roles of judge and jury.155 In his majority opinion
denying liability, Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo focused on
whether the defendant railroad owed a duty to the plaintiff, who
was standing on the defendant’s platform, but “many feet away”

151. See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 828 (Cal. 1989) (holding that a
plaintiff cannot recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress
arising from witnessing serious physical harm to another unless the plaintiff
is “closely related” to the other victim, even if the emotional distress was
genuine and severe and the result is “arbitrary”); see also DOBBS ET AL.,
HORNBOOK ON TORTS, supra note 139, at 718 (“Regardless of foreseeable and
actual emotional harm to the plaintiff, plaintiff would be denied recovery
under [California’s] new rule unless she was actually present and witnessed
the injury or threat to a close relation.”).
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
153. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017).
154. Neither opinion recognized another problem with asking lay jurors to
apply a directness test for proximate cause: even properly instructed about
the law, jurors remain confused about the legal standard. See supra text
accompanying notes 73, 74, 75, 76; Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow,
Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury
Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1353 (1979) (finding that 23% of jurors
understood “proximate” cause as “approximate” cause, meaning “estimated
cause” or some other misconception).
155. 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
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from a negligently caused explosion.156 He argued that this
question should be resolved by the judge as a matter of duty, and
thus an issue of law, avoiding proximate cause, typically
considered an issue for the jury.157 This act of judicial
transubstantiation shifted the decision making from the jury to
the judge. Judge Andrews and two of his colleagues vigorously
disagreed, insisting that the trial judge had been correct to submit
the issue to the jury.158
The
American
Law
Institute
has
recognized the
Cardozo/Andrews debate as a “tension in tort law about the proper
balance between duty rules and proximate-cause limits to
circumscribe appropriately the scope of liability.”159 The
Restatement (Third) of Torts elaborates:
Duty is a question of law for the court . . . while scope of
liability, although very much an evaluative matter, is
treated as a question of fact . . . Hence, duty is a
preferable means for addressing limits on liability when
those limitations are clear, are based upon relatively
bright lines, when they are of general application, when
they do not usually require resort to disputed facts in a
case, when they implicate policy concerns that may not be
fully appreciated by a jury deciding a specific case, and
when they are employed in cases in which early
resolution of liability is particularly desirable.160
The policies identified in the Restatement that support a
156. Id. at 99–100.
157. Id. at 101 (“The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus
foreign to the case before us. The question of liability is always anterior to
the question of the measure of the consequences that go with liability. If
there is no tort to be redressed, there is no occasion to consider what damage
might be recovered if there were a finding of a tort.”).
158. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 105 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (“Under these
circumstances I cannot say as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s injuries
were not the proximate result of the negligence.”); see William E. Crawford &
David J. Shelby II, Time Frame Torts, 53 LA. L. REV. 1011, 1023 (1993) (“This
is all definitively treated in Palsgraf; Cardozo’s majority opinion represents
the determination of the scope of duty as a question of law . . . and Andrews’
dissent represents the classic application of proximate cause as an issue of
fact for the jury.”).
159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29
(AM. LAW INST. 2010).
160. Id.
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preference for duty rules in some contexts are tailor-made for City
of Miami. First, a holding that lenders have no duty to
municipalities for the impact of discrimination on government
coffers provides a “bright-line rule” of “general application” that
does not require the consideration, let alone the resolution, of
“disputed facts.”161 Instead, the majority’s decision to remand
invites the parties and the court to wade into complex factual
matters, for example, how much of the harm to the city’s tax base
was due to foreclosures caused by discrimination, as opposed to
other factors idiosyncratic to both individual borrowers and to the
economy more generally. Similarly, on remand, the parties may
have to adduce proof of how much of the city’s increased municipal
costs were due to foreclosures on minority borrowers and how
much was caused by other economic factors. Second, a no-duty
determination would encourage a court to focus explicitly on
“policy concerns,” and how a string of substantial judgments
against lenders might have catastrophic impact on the local,
regional, and national economy. There is also risk that a jury
could be influenced by the realization that a substantial verdict
for the plaintiff could lead to lower local taxes. And, finally, early
resolution of complex economic cases like those presented in City
of Miami means less of a burden on judges and juries.
Additional support for approaching FHA claims by
municipalities as a matter of law comes from how the common law
resolves scope of liability issues when a party attempts to use a
violation of a criminal statute in a negligence action. Under the
doctrine of negligence per se, if the harm the plaintiff suffered was
within the class of harms that the statute was intended to
prevent, and the plaintiff was in the class of people intended to be
protected by the statute, then the judge determines negligence as
a matter of law, usurping the traditional role of the jury.162 This
requires the judge to identify the legislative purpose for passing
the law, and then determine how close the legislative purpose is to
the plaintiff’s injury.163 As the most recent Restatement
recognizes, this “statutory-purpose” doctrine “resembles the scope
161. Id.
162. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14
cmt. c; KEETON ET AL., supra note 88, at 229–30.
163. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS, supra note 139, at 256;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 cmt. f.
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of liability doctrine that is applied in ordinary negligence
cases . . . .”164 While divining legislative intent may be difficult in
individual cases,165 this exercise is nevertheless better-suited to a
judge than a lay jury,166 and further suggests that the remand in
City of Miami was unwise.167
C. The End of an Era?
By selecting “directness” as the analytical framework for
determining causation, but remanding for application, the Court
provided municipalities, in theory at least, the chance to prove

164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14
cmt. f; accord DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS, supra note 139, at 326
(“Proximate cause is part of the language of common law tort analysis that is
often equivalent to the class of person/type risk or harm analysis in cases of
statutory violation.”).
165. See Barbara Kritchevsky, Whose Idea Was It? Why Violations of
State Laws Enacted Pursuant to Federal Mandates Should Not Be Negligence
Per Se, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 693, 724 (“A problem with hinging the
applicability of negligence per se on legislative intent is that the intent can be
very difficult to decipher . . . .”); DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS, supra
note 139, at 256 (“Statutes do not always clearly indicate what class of
persons and risks they are intended to protect against.”).
166. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM
§ 17; see also DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS, supra note 139, at 257 (“The
best way [for a judge attempting to determine the applicability of a statute for
the purposes of negligence per se] is by adhering to the foreseeability principle
that runs through the common law of torts . . . . The standard is also familiar
to judges and lawyers from the analogous cases of ‘proximate cause.’”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14
cmt. f (“In determining the purpose of the statute, the court can rely on the
ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, including the language or text
of the statutory provision, its location within the larger statutory scheme, the
more general context of the statute, and indications of specific legislative
intent.”).
167. The judicial role in negligence per se cases has been criticized for
giving too much power to the judge. See Robert F. Blomquist, The Trouble
with Negligence Per Se, 61 S. C. L. REV. 221, 278 (2009) (“By virtue of the
negligence per se doctrine, relatively abstract considerations of legislative
purpose—ungrounded, by definition, in either concrete statutory text or
concrete specific legislative intent—are ritualistically invoked by judges in a
highly manipulable process that leads to divergent and unpredictable
results.”). But proximate cause determinations also arise in uncharted
waters. See Caroline Forell, The Statutory Duty Action in Tort: A
Statutory/Common Law Hybrid, 23 IND. L. REV. 781, 797 (1990) (finding that
negligence per se can be used by judges to improperly expand judicial
authority).
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their allegations and thus have some leverage for settlement.168
But the language in the majority opinion provides financial
institutions much less basis for concern than would have been the
case if foreseeability were the focus on remand.169 From this
perspective, City of Miami bolsters the reputation of the Roberts
Court as a friend of big business.170
If it turns out that City of Miami imposed a “rigorous”
causation requirement, the result will strike a serious blow in the
fight to rectify the wide-spread harms caused by predatory
lending, leaving the task to individual plaintiffs, perhaps
proceeding via class action.171 In this regard, City of Miami
closely resembles a FHA case decided by the Court two years
previously, Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v.
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.172 In that 5–4 decision, the
Court held that plaintiffs could prove housing discrimination by
adducing proof of “disparate impact.”173 While allowing that
168. See Chris Bruce, Bias Suits against Banks Face Test on Causal
Links,
BLOOMBERG
BNA:
BANKING
DAILY
(June
19,
2017),
https://www.bna.com/bias-suits-against-n73014453561/ (raising the prospect
of settlement after remand).
169. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017)
(“[F]oreseeability alone does not ensure the close connection that proximate
cause requires . . . . [The Fair Housing Act] requires ‘some direct relation
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’”).
170. See J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Roberts Court
and Economic Issues in an Era of Polarization, 67 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 693,
695 (2017); Adam Winkler, Why Big Business Keeps Winning at the Supreme
Court, WASH. POST (June 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/posteverything/wp/2017/06/26/why-big-business-keeps-winning-at-thesupreme-court/?utm_term=.62bcf032d89f.
171. Class actions may turn out not to be an option, as the Roberts Court
has significantly constricted the availability of class actions. See Theodore J.
Boutrous, Jr. & Bradley J. Hamburger, Three Myths about Wal-Mart Stores v.
Dukes, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO, 45, 48 (2014) (finding that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011), narrowed the availability of class actions for sex discrimination claims
and is likely to apply in other contexts); see also Michelle Gallo, Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes: The Fatal Class Action Suit, 20 Dig. NAT’L IT. AM. B.
ASS’N L.J. 69, 77 (2012) (“This decision reinforced a pattern of the Supreme
Court rulings making it more challenging for complainants, whether
employees or consumers, to bring their issues to court.”).
172. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
173. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53
UCLA L. REV. 701, 702 (2006) (“Within antidiscrimination law, no theory has
attracted more attention or controversy than the disparate impact theory,
which allows proof of discrimination without the need to prove an intent to
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claim to proceed, the Court sharply constricted the use of
“disparate
impact”
by
imposing
a
“robust
causality
174
requirement.”
This result appears to be a close cousin of the
imposition of a directness test in City of Miami: both cases appear
at first blush to be victories for plaintiffs asserting FHA claims,
but in both cases, the application of the law to the facts suggests
that no liability will ultimately be allowed.175
The stakes were certainly high in City of Miami, as a holding
for the banks would mean the end of an era of progressive FHA
holdings, while a decision that lacked a limiting concept could
have exposed banks to billions of dollars in liability. One can only
speculate, but perhaps in both City of Miami and Inclusive
Communities the more progressive justices (Ginsberg, Breyer,
Sotomayer, and Kagan) were faced with choosing between a
haircut and a beheading, and they were willing to make
concessions on causation in order to garner a fifth vote from a
more moderate colleague (Roberts in City of Miami, and Kennedy
in Inclusive Communities).
Such a judicial compromise is suggested by the oral argument
in City of Miami, when both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy expressed concern with the practical ramifications of
permitting suits against banks to proceed.176 By helping Justice
discriminate.”).
174. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2512; see Clegg,
supra note 84, at 170–71 (explaining that the majority’s discussion in
Inclusive Communities, of the need for plaintiffs to satisfy a “robust causality
requirement,” suggests that the plaintiff’s case may be doomed on remand).
175. See John L. Ropiequet, Has the US Supreme Court Sounded the
Death Knell for Fair Lending Cases?, 36 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP.
6 (2017) (“This decision [in City of Miami], coupled with the robust causation
requirement announced in Inclusive Communities, may sound the death knell
for future fair lending litigation . . . .”). It appears that the causation issue in
Inclusive Communities concerned whether there was a factual link between
the defendant’s wrong doing and the plaintiff’s injuries, which, in theory at
least, is distinguishable from the causation issue in City of Miami, which
assumed that the plaintiff had adequately pleaded cause-in-fact. See Richard
W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1740 (1985) (stating
that confusion is created by failing to distinguish factual causation from
proximate causation); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
176. Amy Howe, Argument analysis: City likely to prevail, one way or
another, in fair housing case, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 8, 2016, 8:21 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/11/argument-analysis-city-likely-to-prevailone-way-or-another-in-fair-housing-case/.
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Breyer form a majority, which then pruned rather than overruled
progressive precedents, Chief Justice Roberts could serve two
goals. The first would be avoiding a 4–4 split, something he may
be at pains to avoid.177 Second, a decision that appears consistent
with progressive precedents deflects the perception that the Court
engages in overtly “political” behavior like “horse-trading”178—
though that is a charge that the justices regularly deflect.179 Such
concern for institutional appearances was prominent in much of
the analysis of Chief Justice Roberts’ decision to uphold
Obamacare,180 and could well have been at play in City of Miami.
This would not be a surprising development, as the
increasingly conservative justices on the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts have had to decide what to do with the liberal decisions of
177. Ilya Shapiro, Introduction, 2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1
(characterizing Chief Justice Roberts as “working hard to craft or facilitate
narrow rulings and thus avoid 4–4 splits.”).
178. Jeffrey R. Seul, Settling Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV. 881, 896
(2004) (“Although negotiation among the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court
is highly stylized, there is no question that they negotiate. They do not
engage in . . . coarse horse-trading . . . ; rather, they ‘accommodate’ their own
ideological perspectives to others’ perspectives as necessary to substantially
achieve their own objectives.”); see also Marie A. Failinger, Against Idols: The
Court as a Symbol-Making or Rhetorical Institution, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW
367, 374 (2006) (describing the “conspiracy theory” of Supreme Court
behavior, in which justices make “lofty and objective-sounding arguments
while secretly they vote according to their own personal interests, prejudices,
or intuitions about injustice”).
179. See Garance Franke-Ruta, The Supreme Court Has Solved the Angry
E-Mail Problem: Justices Only Send Each Other Memos on Paper, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2013/10/the-supreme-court-has-solved-the-angry-email-problem-justices-onlysend-each-other-memos-on-paper/280663/ (“[W]e’re not horse trading. We’re
not bargaining. We’re reasoning.”); see also Jeffrey Rosen, A Majority of One,
N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/03/magazine/amajority-of-one.html?mcubz=1 (“[T]here is little lobbying or horse-trading on
the Rehnquist court.”).
180. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); see
also Tonja Jacobi, Obamacare as a Window on Judicial Strategy, 80 TENN. L.
REV. 763, 763 (2013) (stating that Roberts’ vote upholding the statute was
predominantly “institutional” rather than “doctrinal,” an effort to insulate
the Court from the appearance of partisan decision-making immediately
before a presidential election, to guard his own personal reputation from
charges of partisan manipulation, and to increase judicial power); Adam
Liptak, Roberts Shows Deft Hand as Swing Vote on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES
(June 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/us/politics/a-definingmove-for-chief-justice-roberts.html (“[Roberts] chose compromise, or perhaps
statesmanship.”).
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the Warren and Burger Courts; some say that the result has been
“stealth overruling.”181 A similar strategy was adopted by the
California Supreme Court when conservative justices replaced
liberals in the 1980’s:182 a conservative majority would write
opinions that acknowledged earlier ground-breaking tort decisions
like Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,183 Dillon v. Legg,184
Rowland v. Christian, 185 and Tarasoff v. Regents of the University
of California,186 but nevertheless reached conservative
181. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With
Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (2010); Richard
M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861,
1863–64 (2014) (describing criticism of the Roberts Court for “narrowly
interpreting—but not overruling—precedents in such hot-button areas such as
abortion, campaign finance, standing, affirmative action, the Second
Amendment, the exclusionary rule, and Miranda rights”).
182. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort
Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social
Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 45–46 (2002) (“In a number of historic firsts, the
California Supreme Court led the way in carving out new categories of
plaintiff recovery in nearly every corner of tort law. California recognized
new remedies for non-pecuniary injuries, loss of consortium, prenatal
injuries, punitive damages, medical monitoring, wrongful life and wrongful
birth. Plaintiffs were also permitted to recover against co-defendants under
the novel theory of concerted action.”).
183. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (holding that a plaintiff in a products
liability action need not prove that the defendant was guilty of negligence
because negligence is irrelevant to a strict liability claim). But see Daly v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1168–69 (Cal. 1978) (refusing to follow the
logic of Greenman by allowing plaintiff’s fault to reduce or eliminate
recovery).
184. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (holding that a bystander to a serious
physical injury to another person may recover for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress even if not subject to physical impact or in the zone of
danger if the injury was “foreseeable”). Dillon was limited in Thing v. La
Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989) (replacing foreseeability with a rule
requiring proof of multiple factors).
185. 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (holding that occupiers of premises owe
a duty of reasonable care to all entrants injured on the premises, even
trespassers). This generous approach to premises liability did not survive.
See, e.g., Ky. Fried Chicken of Cal., v. Super. Ct., 927 P.2d 1260, 1270 (Cal.
1997) (holding that an occupier of premises owes no duty to protect entrants
on the premises from criminal assaults).
186. 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976) (holding that, when a therapist
diagnoses, or reasonably should have diagnosed, that a patient represents a
threat of serious harm to others, the therapist owes an affirmative duty of
care to protect a foreseeable victim of that danger). Tarasoff was limited by
subsequent decisions. See Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728,
738 (Cal. 1980) (limiting the class of plaintiffs who can sue therapist for
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outcomes.187
CONCLUSION

While City of Miami and Inclusive Communities allow FHA
plaintiffs to survive the pleading stage, the fate of the FHA claims
in lower courts is in doubt if judges heed the Court’s implied
message that such claims should be viewed through skeptical
eyes.188 This may mean that both sides will consider settling
rather than undergoing the expense of a full round of litigation,
but there is now considerably less pressure on lenders to do so. If,
however, the end result is something short of a substantial
financial settlement, then champions of civil rights in general, and
fair housing in particular, will find that the victory in City of
Miami was largely illusory.189

negligence).
187. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 182, at 52 (“The principal reason for
the [California Supreme Court’s] retrenchment has been its change in
composition with the appointment of more conservative justices.”); Bill Blum,
Toward a Radical Middle: Has A Great Court Become Mediocre?, 77 A.B.A. J.
48, 50 (1991) (“In tort law, on the other hand, the [California Supreme Court]
has embarked on a clear course of cutting back the principles of liability and
the bases for relief.”); see also Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the
Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601,
604 (1992) (describing how courts can stem the expansion of tort law without
expressly overruling precedents).
188. This outcome is even more likely because the Supreme Court has
tightened pleading requirements in civil actions generally. See Alexander A.
Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117,
2118 (2015) (discussing the impact of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Iqbal v.
Ashcroft, which upended the liberal pleading doctrine that had “remained
essentially static for five decades”).
189. Of course, a damages remedy under the FHA does not cure the
segregating impact of government policies that are race-neutral, like zoning
regulations that prohibit the building of low-income and moderate-income
housing in predominantly white neighborhoods. See Sarah Schindler,
Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation Through Physical
design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J. 1934, 1980 (2015) (“There is
much evidence to suggest the use of facially race-neutral exclusionary zoning
as a strategy to further racial homogeneity and to exclude racial minorities.”).

